Maaike
Vollebergh

Supply chain allocation and coordination problems

Start Date Research: 11/15/2022
This research project wants to solve allocation and coordination problems in supply chain management using methods such as game theory. Between a lot of applications, game theory is a well-established discipline for analysing assignment problems. It allows modelling collaboration, for example, through the exchange of information, and defining allocation rules that take into account the synergy of collaboration. A common problem nowadays in supply chain operations is scarcity. A question that arises is how to “fairly” allocate the scarce products among the different actors. In the first year of this research project, we take a departure from the conventional retailer’s viewpoint in game theory and study the supplier’s perspective. By introducing an extension to the well-known (single-period) Bankruptcy Problem and associated bankruptcy rules, we adopt a multi-period perspective, which is applicable to a wide range of assignment problems in different fields of research. In the following years, we want to analyse how the different bankruptcy rules perform for the multi-period bankruptcy problem when there is collaboration, information exchange, etc. among the actors using game theoretical concepts and theories. Collaboration in supply chain management addresses inefficiencies at the supply chain level and enables partners to tackle various issues such as waste and emissions. Retailers could, for example, decide to “share” products of which the demand may have been overestimated in one location while being underestimated in another. At this stage, it is unclear whether the novel bankruptcy rules we are deriving in the first year will still be applicable in this case. Another aspect to take into account is the concept of information sharing. In this part of the research, a non-cooperative game could be proposed, requiring players to share information. This sharing of information would aim to improve the overall supply chain performance, particularly for items where more timely decision-making is crucial, such as perishable items. The outcomes of analysing such a game could be implemented in the contracts among the different agents in the supply chain. We believe that this research can yield important academic insights, can increase the (practical) value of the proposed bankruptcy rules and can lead to improved insights on the practice of supply chain coordination and information exchange.
Supervisors: Wout Dullaert, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Yousef Ghiami